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Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of economic conditions on Portuguese local electoral 
outcomes. We use two extensive datasets to estimate an economic voting model which 
accounts for the possibility that different levels of government have different levels of 
responsibility for economic outcomes and for clarity of government responsibility. 
Empirical results indicate that the performance of the national economy is important 
especially if local governments are of the same party as the central government. The 
municipal situation is also relevant particularly in scenarios of higher clarity of 
government responsibility.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper analyzes economic voting in Portuguese local elections. The main purpose 
of the paper is to investigate whether economic conditions affect local electoral outcomes 
in a way that is consistent with the responsibility hypothesis. Since Portuguese local 
governments are responsible for improving the well-being of the population that resides 
in the municipality and have a wide range of opportunities for intervention that affects 
local economic activity, we expect that they will be held accountable for local economic 
performance. Having no jurisdiction over national economic policies, local governments 
should not, in principle, be held responsible for national economic performance. That is, 
according to the responsibility hypothesis, national economic conditions are only 
expected to affect the popularity and votes of the national government. But, as noted by 
Carsey and Wright (1998), the electorate may wish to reward, or punish the national 
government in second tier (local) elections. Thus, it is possible that the votes received by 
local governments headed by the party that controls the national government are affected 
by national economic conditions. 
Although Veiga and Veiga (2010) present evidence that the results of Portuguese 
legislative elections are affected by the performance of the national economy and, to a 
lesser extent, by municipal economic conditions, to our knowledge, there are no studies 
focusing on the effects of national and local economic outcomes on Portuguese local 
electoral results.1 This article tries to fill this gap in the literature by performing an 
empirical analysis that uses two extensive datasets. The first is a panel dataset covering 
                                                 
1 Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2010) use Portuguese local election data in the context of a simultaneous 
equations model that tests for the presence of political business cycles and for their effects on the win 
margin of the incumbent mayor. 
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the 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities2 over the period 1979-2005, encompassing 8 
electoral periods. The second is a cross-sectional dataset for the 2001 local elections 
covering the 4037 Portuguese mainland freguesias3.  
In order to analyze the electoral accountability of Portuguese local governments, we 
estimate a vote function that models the effects of the economic environment taking into 
account the relationship between local and national governments and clarity of 
responsibility constraints. We start by testing whether the votes received by local 
incumbents are affected or not by national economic outcomes in a model that 
differentiates local governments affiliated with the party that rules the nation from other 
municipal incumbents. We hypothesize that these affiliated governments may be subject 
to political accountability effects. Partisan effects are also tested for in order to check if 
local authorities’ ideological orientation affect electoral outcomes. We then proceed to 
test for the importance of regional economic indicators in the vote function, assuming 
that more clarity of responsibility may strengthen economic voting. Finally, the cross-
sectional data is used to investigate the impact of local unemployment on local electoral 
outcomes, and as a robustness check of the panel data results. 
The article is organized as follows. The Section 2 discusses economic voting in local 
elections. Section 3 presents a short tour on some aspects of Portuguese elections. Section 
4 describes the model and dataset used. The panel data results obtained are presented in 
                                                 
2 Mainland Portugal is divided into 278 municipalities (municípios or concelhos). Usually, a municipality 
has the name of its biggest town or city or, in some cases, of its historically most important town or city. 
The municipality is, usually, considerably larger than the city or town after which it is named. 
3 Each Municipality is subdivided into a variable number of Freguesias. These are the lowest 
administrative units in Portugal. As far as we can tell, no previous study has used a dataset covering all the 
Portuguese mainland freguesias. 
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section 5, while section 6 reports the cross section results for the unemployment rate. 
Finally, conclusions are presented in section 7. 
 
2. Economic Voting in Local Elections 
There are good reasons to suppose that local economic conditions influence national 
electoral results. Voters may use the local environment as a proxy for the general 
situation of the country or/and think that the policies implemented by the national 
government actually have a significant effect in the local economy. Although the number 
of papers that analyzes the importance of local economic indicators in legislative 
electoral results is relatively small,4 they generally confirm that both national and local 
economic conditions are important in explaining voting. However, in the literature on 
local elections the results found do not exhibit such a consensus. Studies like the ones 
from Atkeson and Partin (1995), Hansen (1999), Squire and Fastnow (1994) for the US, 
highlight the importance of the regional economy, while Remmer and Gelineau (2003) 
for Argentina, Belanger and Galineau (2005) for Canada, and Peltzman (1987) and Kone 
and Winters (1993) for the US, find evidence in favor of the importance of national, but 
not subnational economic conditions.  
One key issue when addressing economic voting in local elections is the viability of 
the responsibility hypothesis. With national elections, no matter which level of the 
economy we consider, there are arguments supporting the hypothesis that incumbents 
will be rewarded or punished based on economic performance. With municipal elections 
the formulation of the responsibility hypothesis is more problematic. One can argue that 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, Auberger and Dubois (2005), Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004), Holbrook (1991), 
Jonhston and Pattie (2001), Strumpf and Phillippe (1999), and Veiga and Veiga (2010). 
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governments should be held accountable only for economic results over which they exert 
some control (Anderson, 2006). According to this view, local governments cannot be 
reasonably held accountable for national policies because they do not control the major 
levels of macroeconomic policy. However, voters might consider the national economic 
environment in their decision process. For example, some may prefer to cast their votes 
in for or against the parties controlling the national government, viewing their vote in a 
local election as a referendum on the central government’s performance. Others may link 
their choices to the political ties established between different levels of government.5 
Adverse national economic conditions may reduce their electoral support for the central 
government’s party in local elections, and increase support for other parties.  
At the subnational level, both the central government and the local authorities can be 
held responsible for the economic conditions, creating a problem of clarity of 
responsibility for voters. According to Powell and Whitten (1993), factors that undermine 
the clarity of incumbent policymakers’ responsibility remove the effects of economic 
variables on election outcomes. In local elections, the voters’ task of assessing which 
economic results are affected by local government policies and which are determined by 
central authorities can vary in difficulty across municipalities and across time. The most 
favorable scenario for assessing responsibility would occur when the same party heads 
national and the local governments and both govern with majorities. The least favorable 
scenario for assessing responsibility would occur when different parties rule at local and 
centralized governmental levels, and rule is by coalitions rather than majorities. If the 
                                                 
5 Niemi et. al. (1995) and Carsey and Wright (1998) find that this multilevel governance plays an important 
role in explaining local election results. Concretely, the party that controls the national government tends to 
be rewarded/punished in second tier elections for good/bad economic outcomes. 
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reward/punishment mechanism is important in local elections outcomes, one should 
expect to find it at least in the first case. As clarity of responsibility decreases, especially 
if the party ties between both governments are broken, the economic dimension may 
disappear from the voters’ decision making processes. 
 
3. Brief characterization of Portuguese elections  
On April 25, 1974 democracy was re-established in Portugal, ending 48 years of 
dictatorship. A period of considerable political instability that followed (with 6 
provisional governments) ended in 1976 when a new Constitution was approved and the 
first legislative elections took place. Between 1976 and 1987 several governments ruled 
but none stayed in office for the entire term. In contrast, since 1987, only one government 
failed to complete a full four year term. Portugal is a typical multiparty system that has 
generated one-party majority governments, coalition governments of two or three parties, 
and one-party minority governments. Table 1 summarizes the post-revolution Portuguese 
governments. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The 1976 Constitution formally established the Portuguese municipalities and in 
December of that year the first local elections were held. All subsequent elections took 
place in December, 6 except the most recent one, which was held in October 2009.  
In each municipality there is a Town Council and a Municipal Assembly. The first 
has the executive power - it implements local policies. The second is a deliberative body 
that approves the overall framework of local policies. The members of the Town Council 
and a part of the members of the Municipal Assembly are elected directly by the voters 
                                                 
6 Election years were: 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, and 2005.  
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registered in the municipality. The remaining seats in the Assembly are held by the 
presidents of the councils of the Freguesias7 which belong to the municipality. 
These three bodies of local governance (Town Council, Municipal Assembly and 
Council of the Freguesia) serve four year terms and local residents are called upon to 
vote on the same day for party or independent lists presented for each of them. The 
outcome is determined, directly or indirectly, by the Hondt method8 for transforming 
votes into seats. The selected mayor is the candidate from the top of the list that gains the 
most votes. The mayor presides over the Town Council meetings and plays a  key role in 
the municipal government. He assigns tasks to the other Town Council members, 
manages human resources, authorizes contracts and licenses and, in accordance with the 
general policy framework, chooses which projects to implement and influences the 
timing of their implementation. 
Portuguese local governments, in which the mayor is the principal decision maker, 
are responsible for the organization of the territory, social and economic development, 
and the task of supplying local public goods such as water, transportation, housing, 
healthcare, education and culture9. Their wide range of intervention makes them 
responsible for the well-being of the population that resides in the municipality. The fact 
that they are of substantial importance in local economic activity, potentially ties the 
municipal government’s electoral fortune to the economic environment. 
                                                 
7 Freguesias are the lowest administrative unit in Portugal. The president and council members are elected 
directly by the voters living in the area. 
8 The Hondt method is a highest averages method for allocating seats in party-list proportional 
representation. 
9 Law 159/99 defines the areas of intervention of Portuguese local governments. 
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4. Data and Model Specification 
To analyze the economic determinants of local governments’ electoral results we use 
two extensive datasets. The first is comprised of panel data for all mainland 
municipalities (currently 278), ranging from 1979 to 2005, and covering 8 electoral 
periods. 
The second is a cross-sectional dataset that focuses on the 2001 local elections and 
comprises all mainland freguesias (a total of 4037). Normally unemployment data is not 
available at the level of freguesias, but because 2001 was a census year, data for the 
unemployment rate at both municipal and freguesia levels are available. This enables us 
to investigate the political salience of the local unemployment rate at a much more 
disaggregated level than previous studies have attempted.  
Electoral results and political data were obtained from the Technical Staff for Matters 
Concerning the Electoral process (STAPE). To characterize the national economic 
environment we use the two variables that have received the greatest empirical support in 
vote functions: inflation and unemployment. The inflation rate was acquired from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics while the unemployment rate was obtained from 
the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators. The regional unemployment rate (at the 
freguesia level) and the per-capita GDP (at the NUTS III10 level) were obtained from the 
Portuguese National Institute of Statistics (INE).11  
                                                 
10 NUTS is a geocode standard for referencing the subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes, used 
within the European Union. In Portugal, a hierarchy of three NUTS levels is established. Continental 
Portugal correspond to a NUTS I region, which is subdivided into 5 NUTS II regions. These 5 regions are 
then subdivided into 28 sub regions (NUTS III) each one comprised of several municipalities.  
11 The NUTS III unemployment rate was available only from 1999 onwards, thus reducing time variability 
and the number of observations. Furthermore, with only 2 elections covered it was not possible to use the 
GMM methodology.  
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Data on the number of employees in firms and the average municipal wage are 
available since 1985 in the “Quadros de Pessoal” database of the Portuguese Ministry of 
Labour and Social Solidarity (MTSS)12. As a measure of municipal income, we use the 
Marktest’s income index that reflects municipalities’ wealth by taking into consideration 
the fiscal burden, electricity consumption, automobiles sales and the number of bank 
agencies and of retail stores. 
The empirical model for the vote functions has an autoregressive component and is of 
the following form: 
EiiEiEiEiEi
EiEiEiEiEi
uRECANDTOENPPOP
ECOrDumECOGVGV
,,7,6,5,4
,3,,21,1, )(
++++++
++×+= −
ναααα
ααα
 (1) 
2005 2001, 1997, 1993, 1989, 1985, 1982, 1979,,278,...1 == Ei  
where EiGV , is the percentage of votes obtained in municipality i by the local 
incumbent government’s principal party in the election for the Town Council and 
EiECO ,  is a set of national and/or local economic variables that may affect votes for the 
local government’s party. Then, to control for non economic factors we include a set of 
additional explanatory variables. EiPOP ,  is a discrete variable reflecting the size of the 
municipality13. In principle, higher vote shares are harder to obtain in more populous 
municipalities. Thus, we expect a negative coefficient for population. EiENP ,  is the 
Laakso and Taegepera (1979) index for the effective number of political parties/forces 
that represent electoral lists in each municipality. It controls for political fragmentation 
and electoral competitiveness, which are expected to be negatively related to the vote 
                                                 
12 This is a yearly mandatory employment survey that covers almost all privately owned firms employing 
paid labor in Portugal (public servants and own employment are not included).  
13 It equals 1 for Lisbon and Porto, 2 for other municipalities with population over 40000, 3 for 
municipalities with population between 10000 and 40000, and 4 for the remaining municipalities. 
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share of the incumbent local government party. EiTO ,  is the number of consecutive terms 
in office for the same party. Given the ample evidence of costs of ruling found in the 
literature,14 we expect that the coefficient associated with this variable has a negative 
sign. EiRECAND ,  is a dummy equal to 1 when the Mayor runs for another term, thus 
capturing personality effects, which are expected to have a positive effect on 
votes. EirDum ,)(  represents the set of r dummy variables interacting with the vector of 
economic variables ( EiECO , ) in order to capture effects of alternative governance 
scenarios. We define three cases for r. The first is a dummy variable that indicates a local 
government controlled by the party that holds power at the national level ( SGr = ). The 
second refines this case to situations where the national and local governments are both in 
a majority position ( SMGr = ). The third analyses potential partisan differences, 
permitting differential impacts of economic conditions according to partisan identity. For 
this variable we distinguish situations where the national and local governments are 
simultaneously dominated by the left centre party ( PSr = ) from those where the right 
center party ( PSDr = ) dominates both levels of government.15 Finally, νi is a fixed 
effect for municipality i, and ui,E is the error term. 
 Given the dynamic structure of the model, it is not appropriate to estimate 
equation (1) using OLS. In both the fixed and random effects settings, the lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the error term, even if we assume that the 
disturbances are not themselves autocorrelated. According to Arellano and Bond (1991), 
                                                 
14 Evidence of popularity erosion over time in office was already documented in the seminal paper of 
Mueller (1970). Veiga and Veiga (2004 and 2010) also find evidence of costs of ruling for Portuguese 
governments. 
15 Since only the socialist party (PS) and the social democratic party (PSD) have lead national governments, 
only these two parties have simultaneously dominated national and local governments. 
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this implies inconsistent estimates of the model, when, as in our sample, there is a clear 
dominance of cross sections (278 municipalities) over time periods (8 elections). These 
authors developed a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator that solves the 
problems noted above. First differencing (1) removes the individual effects (νi) and 
produces an equation that is estimable by instrumental variables. In this paper, we use the 
extended version of the GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998), the 
System-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models16. 
 
5. Panel Data Empirical Results 
The first two sets of estimations presented include only national economic indicators 
and the control variables.17 The inflation rate and the unemployment rate are lagged one 
year and they are also used as average percentage annual changes over the entire term to 
test the relevant time horizon for Portuguese voters. Results using System-GMM are 
shown in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
There is evidence that the national economy affects local governments’ electoral 
results, although it seems that Portuguese voters do not attach great importance to the 
more distant past, confirming the findings of Veiga and Veiga (2010) for legislative 
elections. Unemployment only affects local governments that belong to the party that 
holds power at the national level and the effect is found to be stronger when they are both 
                                                 
16 Besides the lagged dependent variable we considered the effective number of parties as an endogenous 
variable. On dynamic panel data models, see chapter 8 of Baltagi (2008). 
17 Since regional and municipal data is only available after 1993, for most variables, their inclusion would 
severely reduce the number of observations and the time-period covered. Thus, in order to be able to use 
data since 1979, we start by including just the national economic variables. Regional and municipal 
economic variables will be considered in the estimations of tables 4 and 5. 
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majority governments. Although municipal incumbents have little control over the 
macroeconomic environment, they seem to be held accountable, as an increase in 
national-level unemployment or inflation affects negatively their chances of reelection. 
Thus, as suggested by Carsey and Wright (1998), the electorate tends to penalize 
(reward) the party of the national government in local elections for bad (good) economic 
outcomes. Furthermore, the penalty/reward is stronger for governments that enjoy greater 
power and responsibility over economic policy (majority governments), as Powell and 
Whitten (1993) suggest. 
The results also indicate that the inflation rate negatively affects local authorities that 
are not affiliated with the central government. We think that this may be related to some 
degree of misperceived accountability. As the national inflation is taken as a benchmark 
for price increases in some public goods that are provided by the municipality, such as 
public transportation, healthcare, education and water, voters may attribute these higher 
prices to direct policy decisions emanating from the local governments. 
The control variables exhibit the expected signs. The size of the population, the 
effective number of parties, and time in office have negative effects, while there is a 
positive effect on votes (which we attribute to personality effects) when the mayor 
decides to run for reelection. Although the autoregressive component does not suggest 
high persistence of vote shares, it is statistically significant and positively signed. 
In Table 3, we consider the possibility that left and right parties will be subjected to 
differing standards in the way that they are rewarded and punished for economic 
conditions. Powell and Whitten (1993) claim that a government should be held more 
responsible for those variables that it, or its constituency, care about the most, while 
 13
Swank’s (1993) partisan hypothesis assumes that higher unemployment rates should 
increase the demand for left-wing governments, as they are more prone to fight 
unemployment, and that higher inflation should increase the demand for right-wing 
governments (which will fight harder to decrease it). In the reported estimations, the 
partisan effects are modeled by the inclusion of dummies indicating the simultaneous 
control of the national and of the local governments by the center-left party (socialist 
party - PS) or by the center-right party (social democratic party - PSD). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The effects of economic variables found to be statistically significant are limited to 
the short run economic performance. Results indicate that, when the same political party 
controls the national and the local government, the socialists (PS) are more penalized in 
municipal elections than the social democrats (PSD) for higher unemployment rates.18 
While a 1% increase in the unemployment rate reduces the vote percentage of PS local 
governments by 0.407%, the effect is half this amount for PSD local governments. 
Regarding inflation, even though there is a slight distinction between parties, a post 
estimation Wald test rejected the statistical significance of this difference. These results 
are in line with Powell and Whitten’s (1993) ideological responsibility hypothesis, as the 
center-left party (PS) tends to be more penalized for increases in unemployment than the 
center-right party (PSD). 
Regional and local economic indicators are included in the estimations of Table 4. 
We use measures by NUTS III region and by municipality. Due to the lack of data for 
                                                 
18 A Wald test confirms the statistical significance of this difference. 
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regional and municipal indicators our sample period is shortened, starting in the 1993 
election for most variables19. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The economy at NUTS III level is not directly under the control of a single local 
government, being an intermediate stage between the local and national environments. 
Nevertheless, the NUTS III per capita GDP (measured in thousands of euros) is 
statistically significant, and the result is supportive of the traditional responsibility 
hypothesis. With municipal-level indicators, effects of economic variables are also weak. 
The only statistically significant municipal economic variable is the growth of municipal 
wages, for the case where responsibility is most clearly inferred (local and national 
majority governments of the same party). In other cases where voters have difficulty in 
sorting out which party should be held responsible, the lack of effects is a plausible 
result. 
We also tested the hypothesis of partisan effects with the economic variables used in 
Table 4, but all the interactions proved to be statistically insignificant, failing to support a 
finding of any partisan effects at the regional level. In order to economize space, we 
chose not to report these results, which are available from the authors upon request. 
 
6. Cross-Section empirical results for the unemployment rate 
This section uses a different dataset in order to test for the effects of freguesia and 
municipal level unemployment rates. We made two changes to the model used in the 
previous section. First, the population category variable by municipality was replaced by 
                                                 
19 Due to the loss of time variability and observations when using local economic variables we didn’t test 
for changes over term. 
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a dummy variable (Urban Areas) which takes the value of one for the freguesias that are 
manly urban areas, and zero otherwise. Second, due to potential problems of 
endogeneity,20 the effective number of parties was replaced by a dummy variable 
accounting for municipalities where non party organizations present electoral lists (Non 
party list).  
Due to the cross sectional nature of the data, albeit is no possible to distinguish 
between partisan and responsibility effects. In 2001, the ruling national party was PS, so 
the interaction dummies refer to the simultaneous governance of the center-left. We do 
not test for clarity effects because the lack of time variability created multicolinearity 
problems between the interaction dummies. 
We use three alternative estimation methods that try to solve the typical problem of 
heteroscedasticity found in cross section analysis21. The first is the standard OLS 
regression with robust standard errors. The second is the weighted least squares (WLS) 
method proposed by Madalla (1983) that identifies the heteroscedastic process and 
proposes a logistic transformation to the dependent variable22. This method takes into 
account the differences in population between freguesias, thus reporting more efficient 
estimators than OLS. In the third method, after the WLS, we use a Feasible Generalized 
Least Square (FGLS)23 in order to control for other unknown factors that may be causing 
                                                 
20 As mentioned above, the effective number of parties was treated as an endogenous variable in the 
System-GMM estimations. As the estimation methods used in this section do not account for endogeneity, 
we preferred to replace that variable by an alternative that does not suffer from potential endogeneity 
problems. 
21 It is necessary to account for heteroscedasticity because both the Breusch-Pagan and the White tests 
rejected the homoscedasticity assumption in our model. 
22 )1/(log( ii VGVGVG −= ). See Dubin and Kaslow (1996) for an application of this method. 
23 Starting with the estimated logistic model, we correct for other potential sources of heteroscedasticity 
using the feasible generalized least square method proposed by Wooldridge (2003). 
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heteroscedasticity. These last two methods are less vulnerable to heteroscedasticity than 
OLS. 
The estimation results, shown in Table 5, are consistent with the panel data findings 
regarding the effects of economic and non economic variables. There is strong evidence 
that local authorities affiliated with the central government are held more accountable for  
high freguesia and municipal unemployment rates than those unaffiliated. Although the 
results confirm the political accountability hypothesis, municipal unemployment also has 
a negative impact on governments without political ties to the ruling national party, an 
effect we lose in the freguesia regressions when controlling heteroscedasticity more 
effectively (when using WLS/FGLS). This indicates the presence of the traditional 
responsibility mechanism when the unemployment aggregation level corresponds to the 
local authority’s jurisdiction. These different results may also be related to the fact that a 
significant portion of the electorate is not likely to vote and work in the same freguesia, a 
scenario more likely to occur when we think in terms of municipalities. Overall, the 
analysis of the 2001 municipal elections confirms the importance of the local 
unemployment rate in the Portuguese government’s vote function. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
7. Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper was to investigate the economic determinants of 
local electoral results in Portugal. We found that both national and regional economic 
conditions influence electoral outcomes. Our results are consistent with the responsibility 
hypothesis and are in line with previous findings for Portuguese legislative elections.  
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Even though local authorities have little control over the national economic 
environment, our results show that there is a mechanism of political accountability 
present at municipal elections. When the same party governs at national and local levels, 
the local governments are punished when the national unemployment increases, and are 
more affected by inflation than the local governments which are not affiliated with the 
national government party. Nevertheless, our data suggests that the latter are affected by 
inflation changes, a result that might be related to effects on national inflation observed 
through prices charged for the provision of local public goods. Finally, we find support 
for the proposition that government ideology affects the relationship between national 
unemployment rates and election outcomes. Concretely, the empirical results support 
Powell and Whitten’s (1993) hypothesis that governments are held more accountable for 
the economic variables that they care about the most. That is, when the same political 
party controls the national and the local governments, the socialists (PS – center-left) are 
more penalized in municipal elections than the social democrats (PSD – center-right) for 
higher unemployment rates. 
Portuguese local governments have been assuming greater and greater responsibilities 
in the areas of economic policy and provision of public goods. Because local 
governments are closer to their population and more aware of local problems than the 
national government, this decentralization process can generate a more efficient 
allocation of resources.  
Among subnational economic variables, we find that only municipal wages seem to 
influence votes in local elections, strictly in situations where municipal and national 
governments belong to the same party and are both in a majority position. These results 
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show that the clarity of responsibility is important for economic voting when evaluating 
economic performance at the regional level.  
Finally, the results obtained when using of cross sectional data clearly indicate that 
the local unemployment rate affects electoral outcomes. Local governments are held 
accountable for local unemployment rates, and the effect is stronger for governments 
politically tied to the national incumbent, confirming the importance of controlling for 
simultaneous governance when analyzing economic voting in local elections.  
 19
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Table 1. Legislative elections and parties in government 
 
Elections Wining party
or coalition 
Share in 
Parliament (%)
Form of 
Government 
1976 PS 43 One party, minority 
1979 AD 51 Coalition (AD) 
1980 AD 54 Coalition (AD) 
1983 PS 40 Coalition (PS+PSD) 
1985 PSD 34 One party, minority 
1987 PSD 59 One party 
1991 PSD 58 One party 
1995 PS 48 One party, minority 
1999 PS 50 One party, “minority” 
2002 PSD 46 Coalition (PSD+CDS/PP) 
2005 PS 52 One party 
 
Note: PS- Socialist Party (center left);AD=PSD+CDS/PP+PPM; PSD- 
Social Democratic Party (center right); CDS/PP- Social Democratic 
Center/People’s Party (right); PPM- Monarchic Popular Party (right). 
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Table 2. Simultaneous governance and the national economy: GMM Panel estimates 
 
 Previous year  Changes over term  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Votes (previous election) 0.170*** 0.152***  0.103** 0.101** 
 (3.76) (3.31)  (2.33) (2.31) 
Unemployment rate 0.252   0.027  
 (1.40)   (0.90)  
Unemployment rate * Dum(SG) -0.213***   0.039  
 (-3.33)   (0.94)  
Unemployment rate * Dum(SMG) -0.321**   0.082  
 (-2.35)   (0.98)  
Inflation rate  -1.517**   0.006 
  (-2.08)   (0.35) 
Inflation rate * Dum(SG)  -0.146***   -0.038* 
  (-4.78)   (-1.66) 
Inflation rate * Dum(SMG)  -0.081   0.045 
  (-1.31)   (0.54) 
Effective Number of Parties -15.076*** -14.542***  -14.348*** -13.828***
 (-7.87) (-7.59)  (-7.07) (-6.68) 
Population -0.996** -0.891**  -0.930** -0.806* 
 (-2.52) (-2.24)  (-2.22) (-1.86) 
Time in office -1.101*** -1.108***  -0.855*** -0.830*** 
 (-5.93) (-6.19)  (-4.79) (-4.62) 
Recand 3.260*** 3.310***  3.798*** 3.929*** 
 (5.37) (5.43)  (5.95) (6.08) 
Observations 2091 2091  1849 1849 
Municipalities / Instruments 275 / 46 275 / 46  275 / 45 275 / 45 
Hansen Test  35.90 [0.290] 33.43 [0.398]  33.81 [0.38] 37.85 [0.22]
AR(1) Test -7.01 [0.00] -7.05 [0.00]  -6.96 [0.00] -7.02 [0.00]
AR(2) Test 1.11 [0.265] 1.05 [0.293]  0.51 [0.611] 0.49 [0.625]
 
NOTES: Two step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples. All 
estimations include a constant term and a complete set of time-dummies, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios and those in squared brackets are p-
values. All estimations include a complete set of time-dummies. 
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Table 3. Partisan effects and the national economy: GMM Panel estimates 
 
 Previous year Changes over term 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Votes (previous election) 0.142*** 0.135*** 0.087** 0.093** 
 (3.29) (3.10) (2.00) (2.11) 
Unemployment rate 0.257  0.019  
 (1.42)  (0.65)  
Unemployment rate * Dum(PSD) -0.206***  0.066  
 (-2.76)  (1.56)  
Unemployment rate * Dum(PS) -0.407***  0.042  
 (-4.65)  (0.82)  
Inflation rate  -1.616**  0.004 
  (-2.22)  (0.22) 
Inflation rate * Dum(PSD)  -0.184***  -0.055 
  (-4.32)  (-1.42) 
Inflation rate * Dum(PS)  -0.160***  -0.028 
  (-4.41)  (-1.17) 
Effective Number of Parties -15.046*** -14.594*** -14.216*** -14.047*** 
 (-8.40) (-7.62) (-6.94) (-6.63) 
Population -0.988** -0.883** -0.905** -0.872** 
 (-2.54) (-2.22) (-2.16) (-2.00) 
Time in office -1.103*** -1.066*** -0.825*** -0.845*** 
 (-5.91) (-6.03) (-4.63) (-4.55) 
Recand 3.294*** 3.296*** 3.831*** 3.876*** 
 (5.53) (5.43) (5.99) (5.96) 
Observations 2091 2091 1849 1849 
Municipalities / Instruments 275 / 46 275 / 46 275 / 45 275 / 45 
Hansen Test  33.78 [0.382] 33.30 
[0.404] 
33.60 [0.390] 38.16 [0.210]
AR(1) Test  -7.16 [0.00] -7.17 [0.00] -7.01 [0.00] -7.03 [0.00] 
AR(2) Test 0.97 [0.332] 0.99 [0.324] 0.41 [0.681] 0.671 [0.671]
 
NOTES: Two step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples. All 
estimations include a constant term and a complete set of time-dummies. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios and those in squared brackets 
are p-values.  
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Table 4. Simultaneous governance and the Regional economy: 
GMM Panel estimates 
 Previous year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Votes (previous election) 0.126*** 
(4.02) 
-0.040 
(-0.53) 
0.006 
(0.051) 
0.114*** 
(3.82) 
Per capita GDP (NUTS) 0.294** 
(2.44) 
   
Per capita GDP (NUTS)* Dum(SG) -0.031 
(-0.46) 
   
Per capita GDP (NUTS)* Dum(SMG) 0.017 
(0.10) 
   
Municipal growth rate of wages  0.003 
(0.070) 
  
Municipal growth rate of wages* Dum(SG)  -0.105 
(-1.19) 
  
Municipal growth rate of wages* 
Dum(SMG) 
 0.199** 
(2.25) 
  
Municipal employment rate    0.044 
(1.03) 
 
Municipal employment rate* Dum(SG)   0.004 
(0.16) 
 
Municipal employment rate* Dum(SMG)   -0.060 
(-0.88) 
 
Municipal Income Index     0.065 
(1.03) 
Municipal Income Index * Dum(SG)    -0.069 
(-0.99) 
Municipal Income Index * Dum(SMG)    0.204 
(1.14) 
Effective Number of Parties -16.116*** 
(-20.4) 
-15.467*** 
(-21.2) 
-15.767*** 
(-20.5) 
-15.983*** 
(-19.5) 
Population -1.029*** 
(-2.63) 
-1.121*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.878* 
(-1.90) 
-1.037*** 
(-2.64) 
Time in office -0.676*** 
(-5.19) 
-0.430* 
(-1.95) 
-0.573 
(-1.60) 
-0.661*** 
(-4.92) 
Recand 4.229*** 
(6.58) 
4.061*** 
(6.96) 
3.892*** 
(6.91) 
4.030*** 
(6.40) 
Observations 1091 1363 1363 1091 
Municipalities / Instruments 275 / 50 275 / 57 275 / 46 275 / 54 
Hansen Test  45.30 [0.194] 55.24 [0.12] 34.29 [0.406] 49.81 [0.19] 
AR(1) Test -5.88 [0.00] -4.86 [0.00] -4.01 [0.00] -5.88 [0.00] 
AR(2) Test 1.49 [0.136] -0.08 [0.937] 0.31 [0.756] 1.53 [0.13] 
NOTES: Two step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples. All 
estimations include a constant term. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers in parenthesis 
are t-ratios and those in squared brackets are p-values. 
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Table 5. Simultaneous governance and the unemployment: cross section estimates  
 Freguesia’s unemployment rate Municipal unemployment rate 
 OLS WLS WLS/FGLS OLS WLS WLS/FGLS
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Votes (previous  0.3002*** 0.0135*** 0.02099*** 0.3034*** 0.0135*** 0.0208*** 
election) (15.4) (12.6) (17.0) (15.7) (12.7) (16.6) 
Unemployment rate 0.1909*** 0.0045 0.00032 -0.3928*** -0.0210*** -0.0243***
 (3.67) (1.47) (0.084) (-3.89) (-3.88) (-3.81) 
Unemployment rate * -0.6180*** -0.0371*** -0.03446*** -0.8239*** -0.0427*** -0.0392***
Dum(SG) (-11.9) (-12.0) (-9.49) (-13.8) (-12.9) (-10.1) 
Urban Areas -3.5610*** -0.1572*** -0.15302*** -3.8924*** -0.1536*** -0.1511***
 (-7.42) (-7.50) (-6.97) (-8.24) (-7.49) (-7.02) 
Recand 5.5224*** 0.1910*** 0.16166*** 5.3960*** 0.1937*** 0.1674*** 
 (9.47) (5.73) (4.02) (9.34) (5.84) (4.04) 
Time in office -0.5848*** -0.0341*** -0.02080*** -0.6770*** -0.0366*** -0.0226***
 (-6.17) (-6.86) (-3.35) (-7.13) (-7.36) (-3.57) 
Non party list -6.4143*** -0.2949*** -0.40502*** -7.1182*** -0.3306*** -0.4488***
 (-6.67) (-6.88) (-7.78) (-7.60) (-8.36) (-9.04) 
Observations 3996 3996 3996 3996 3996 3996 
Adjusted R2  0.16 0.24 0.33 0.18 0.26 0.36 
 
NOTES: All estimations include a constant term. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers in 
parenthesis are t-ratios. 
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Appendix 
 
Descriptive statistics (Panel data) 
 
Variable Observ. Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Votes (% of total) 2462 47.940 11.683 2.924 91.736 
National Unemployment  rate 2224 6.4509 1.5227 4.08 8.86 
National Inflation rate  2224 12.372 9.5472 2.364 28.881 
Per capita GDP (NUTS III) 
(thousands of euros) 1112 8.652 2.7036 4.2840 19.985 
Municipal growth rate of wages 1381 2.6043 6.0014 -26.033 74.579 
Municipal employment rate* 1381 16.306 9.7089 1.1319 87.229 
Municipal Income Index** 1103 3.6264 11.819 0.19 190.79 
Dum(SG) 2223 0.4215 0.493 0 1 
Dum(SMG) 2223 0.1187 0.323 0 1 
Dum(PS) 2221 0.2395 0.426 0 1 
Dum(PSD) 2221 0.2854 0.451 0 1 
Effective Number of Parties 2206 2.6549 0.512 1.1862 4.687 
Population 2224 3.0566 0.744 1 4 
Time in office 2203 2.801634 1.918209 1 8 
Recand 2115 0.801891 0.398669 0 1 
* The employment rate in each municipality is calculated dividing its number of employees by its 
total population.   
** The index’s base is the national average (equal to 100). 
 
 
 
Descriptive statistics (Cross-sectional data) 
 
Variable Observ. Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Votes (% of total) 4000 51.913 15.074 1.71 96.55 
Freguesia’s Unemployment rate 4037 7.007 4.8313 0 38.3 
Municipal Unemployment rate 4037 6.836 2.1945 2.5 22.1 
Dum(SG) 4037 0.482 0.4997 0 1 
Urban Areas 4037 0.239 0.4265 0 1 
Recand 4015 0.853 0.3538 0 1 
Time in office 4015 3.818 2.283 1 7 
Non party list 4035 0.109 0.3117 0 1 
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